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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2A-5/11/84 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, SECOND 
SUPERVISORY DISTRICT, 
Respondent, -•-•—•-.— 
-and- CASE NO. U-6514 
BOCES II TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES, INC. (by JOSEPH IGOE). for 
Respondent 
MARTIN FEINBERG. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of 
Suffolk County Board of Cooperative Educational 
Services, Second Supervisory District (BOCES) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) that it violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing to negotiate 
an "impact demand" made by BOCES II Teachers Association 
(Association). The Director determined that BOCES had 
increased the number of students to be assigned to each 
Board - U-6514 
teacher in its Occupational Education Program;— that 
the Association had demanded, among other things, 
premium pay for additional students; and that after one 
meeting, BOCES broke off negotiations on the ground that 
there had been no change in the number of students 
actually attending each class. 
It is acknowledged that an employer must negotiate 
an impact demand where its unilateral action has, or is 
likely to have, an impact on the terms and conditions of 
employment of its employees. Accordingly, the sole 
issue before us is one of fact: was there a change in 
class size goals which had or was likely to have an 
impact upon the terms and conditions of employment of 
the teachers? The Director found that there was both 
actual and potential impact and the record supports his 
finding. Both the Association's and BOCES' witnesses 
testified that BOCES increased from 25 to 30 the number 
of students whose admission to each class would be the 
relevant goal for its officer responsible for forming 
classes. 
1/ln the past. BOCES has set a goal of assigning 
no more than 25 students to a class. Because of 
circumstances that are not material to the charge, the 
actual number of students who attended a class might 
exceed this goal. BOCES changed that goal from 25 to 30 
students per class, but as before, the number of 
students actually attending a class could exceed the 
number specified in the goal. 
Board - U-6514 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the 
Director, and 
WE ORDER BOCES to negotiate the 
Association's premium pay demand in 
good faith. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
f&Ls^ /U^LKSZ^' 
Ida Klaus. Member 
#2B-5/ll/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6899 
SEWANHAKA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6 943 
NASSAU EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER LOCAL 8 65 
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
DOUGLAS E. LIBBY. ESQ.. for Respondents 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD. ESQ. (HAROLD G. BEYER. JR.. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party in U-6899 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH.. P.C. (DONA S. BULLUCK. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party in U-6943 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Sewanhaka Central High School District (District) 
has a collective bargaining agreement with the Sewanhaka 
Federation of Teachers (Federation) which specifies the 
- 9000 
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terms and conditions of employment of certified teaching 
personnel from July 1, 1982 through June 30, 1984. It has 
four collective bargaining agreements with the Nassau 
Educational Chapter Local 865 of the Civil Service 
Employees Association. AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA) covering four 
units of noncertified personnel for the same period of time. 
While the five collective bargaining agreements 
provide group health insurance for employees in the five 
negotiating units, there is nothing in any of the 
agreements requiring the provision of group health 
insurance to retirees. Notwithstanding the absence of any 
such contractual obligation, the District provided the same 
group health insurance coverage to retirees that it 
provided to employees in the five units until July 1. 1983. 
At a meeting of the District's Board of Education held 
on March 12, 1983, that Board voted to reduce its payment 
of group health insurance premiums on behalf of retirees 
who had been in the unit of the Federation effective July 
1, 1983. During the following month the Federation 
demanded negotiations regarding the group health insurance 
benefits of retirees and the District refused. It then 
filed the charge in U-6899 which alleges that the District 
violated its duty to negotiate health insurance benefits of 
persons who retired during the life of an agreement which 
9 
Board - U-6899/U-6943 -3 
would be retroactive to July 1, 1982, the date when the 
basic collective bargaining agreement took effect. 
On April 15, 1983. the District notified retirees who 
had been in negotiating units represented by CSEA that its 
payment of health insurance premiums on their behalf would 
be reduced effective July 1, 1983. CSEA then demanded that 
the District negotiate the health insurance benefits of its 
retirees and the impact of the District's unilateral 
action. When the District refused, CSEA filed the charge 
in Case U-6943. CSEA's charge complains that the 
District's refusal to negotiate covers the health insurance 
benefits of both individuals who have retired or may retire 
during the term of ah agreement that would be retroactive 
to July 1, 1982 and those who retired previously. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that the 
District is under no obligation regarding the health 
insurance benefits of persons who retired before July 1, 
1982 and he dismissed CSEA's charge to the extent that it 
seeks to negotiate such benefits. He found, however, that 
the District is required to negotiate health insurance 
benefits for persons who were employed by it during the 
term of agreements with the Federation and CSEA and that 
such agreements could be retroactive to the time when the 
basic collective bargaining agreement became effective•. 
- 9002 
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The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
District to the determinations of the ALJ.— Finding 
that the issues in the two charges are identical, we have 
consolidated them for decision. 
The District makes three arguments in support of its 
exceptions. The first is that the demands are not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation in that they cover 
employees who retired even before the demands were made. 
This is not a justification for the District's refusal to 
negotiate the demands before us. In Old Brookville. 16 
PERB 1P094 (1983), we held that a demand for health 
benefits of persons in the unit at the time of the 
effective date of the agreement who retired thereafter but 
before the agreement was concluded is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. 
The District's second argument is that the charges 
merely allege a contract violation and not a violation of 
the duty to negotiate. The record does not support this 
argument. While the parties have negotiated agreements 
which provide health insurance benefits for employees in 
the units represented by both unions, the agreements do not 
deal with the right of persons who retire during their 
terms to receive such benefits after their retirement. The 
i^CSEA has filed no exceptions to that part of the 
ALJ's decision which dismissed part of its charge. 
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demands are therefore subject to mandatory negotiations. 
New Paltz Central School District. 11 PERB 1P057 (1978). 
The District's third argument is the obverse of its 
second. It asserts that by not demanding a health insurance 
retirement benefit for the 1982-84 agreement, the unions 
waived their rights to do so during the term of that 
agreement. There is no evidence in the record in either 
case of an express waiver and none can be implied from 
either union's failure to make a demand for the continuation 
of an extra contractual benefit that the District had been 
providing, and which neither had any reason to anticipate 
that the District would curtail. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decisions of the ALJ, and 
WE ORDER the District to negotiate in 
good faith with the Federation and 
CSEA with respect to the maintenance 
of health insurance premiums for 
employees in negotiating units 
represented by the two unions who may 
retire or who may have retired during 
the term of the existing collective 
bargaining agreements. 
WE FURTHER ORDER the District to post 
the attached notice in all places 
customarily used for communication 
Board - U-6899/U-6943 
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with employees in the negotiating 
units represented by the Federation 
and CSEA. 
DATED: May 11, 1984 
Albany, New York 
:
^>4i£&/£4{f^r*L&t^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
6^*- ££&<<AA-
Ida Klaus . Member 
David C'. Randles \ Membe 
<JU\}0 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC^ EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify al}.l employees in the units represented by the Sewanhaka Federation 
of Teachers and the Nassau Educational Chapter" Local 865 of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, AFSCME,' AFL-CIQ that the Sewanhaka Central High School District: 
Will negotiate in good faith with the Federation and CSEA with respect to the 
maintenance of health insurance premiums for employees in negotiating units repre-
sented by the- two unions who may retire or. who may have retired during the term of 
the existing collective bargaining agreements. 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(employer) 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#20-5/11/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAUPPAUGE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
HAUPPAUGE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (MONA N. GLANZER, ESQ. and 
JOANN M. CALDERONE. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
PACKMAN. OSHRIN & BLOCK. P.C. (ALAN D. OSHRIN. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Hauppauge Teachers Association (Association) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge 
against the Hauppauge Union Free School District 
(District). The charge alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Taylor Law by making unilateral 
changes in its summer school and gifted and talented 
students programs which altered the terms and conditions 
of employment of teachers. 
CASE NO. U-7000 
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The charge contains three specifications complaining 
that summer school teachers who were not assigned to 
classes having Regents' examinations were required to 
proctor such examinations.— Some of the teachers so 
assigned would hot have had to come to school on the day 
when the Regents' examinations were given at the end of 
the 1983 summer school session but for that assignment. A 
fourth specification of the charge complains that teachers 
in the gifted and talented students program were required 
to participate in after-school activities. 
The ALJ dismissed all the specifications of the 
charge on the ground that they were not timely. 
The Association argues that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the three specifications dealing with the 
summer school program as untimely. It asserts that the 
!/one specification alleged that such teachers should 
not have been required to proctor Regents' examinations at 
all. the second was that they should not have been required 
to proctor examinations given in the afternoon, and the 
third was that they should not have been required to 
proctor examinations taken by, among others, students who 
did not attend the District's summer school program. 
Board - U-7000 
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charge was filed within three months of its receipt of a 
letter from the superintendent rejecting a request it made to 
negotiate the subject. It argues that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the one specification dealing with the gifted and 
talented students program as untimely in that—tJie charge was 
filed one day less than four months of its receipt of a 
letter from the superintendent rejecting its request for a 
discussion of compensation for those teachers participating 
in that program. 
These arguments would be relevant if the Association had 
alleged a refusal to negotiate. It did not do so. On its 
face the charge merely complains about unilateral action. 
Moreover, the Association's presentation of its evidence and 
its brief to the ALJ focused only upon the alleged unilateral 
action. A charge complaining of a public employer's 
unilateral action obviously embraces an allegation that the 
employer failed to negotiate his action with the employee 
organization. The time of the alleged violation, however, is 
that of the employer's unilateral action. 
As the ALJ correctly found that the conduct allegedly 
constituting unilateral action occurred more than four months 
prior to the filing of the charge, we affirm his decision. 
QfiM 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 11, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Flarold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
f
*£JzZ/A 
David C. Randies. Membc 
#2D-5/ll/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUNDEE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-6174 
MARTIN MILLER. 
Charging Party. 
MURRY F. SOLOMON, for Respondent 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Martin 
Miller to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing the three specifications of his charge against 
the Dundee Central School District (District). All three 
specifications of the charge derive from Miller's 
statement on questionnaire forms of the District that he 
had Masters and Doctoral degrees from Columbia 
University. The District had been informed by Columbia 
that this was not true, but Columbia would not release a 
copy of Miller's transcript without Miller's permission. 
Board - U-6174 
-2 
The first specification of Miller's charge is that 
the District's Superintendent, Donald J. Averill, denied 
him the opportunity to be accompanied by his attorney at a 
meeting allegedly called by Averill to discuss possible 
disciplinary action against Miller for not making his 
Columbia transcripts available to the District. Miller 
contends that this action was a per se denial of his 
rights under the Act. 
The ALJ dismissed this specification on several 
separate grounds. The ALJ's first ground is based on his 
finding that the meeting was requested by Miller, and that 
Averill did not require Miller's attendance. He concluded 
that Miller had no right to be accompanied by an attorney 
at a meeting called at his request and which he was not 
required to attend. Having reviewed the record, we affirm 
these findings of fact and conclusions of law of the ALJ. 
and his decision dismissing the first specification of the 
charge.^ 
The second and third specifications of the charge 
relate to actions initiated by the District allegedly in 
retaliation for Miller's filing of numerous grievances and 
his criticism of the recognized bargaining representative, 
conduct protected by the Taylor Law. 
i^It is therefore not necessary for us to consider 
the other grounds for the ALJ's dismissal of the first 
specification. 
!Sr 
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The second specification of the charge is that in an 
earlier improper practice case involving the same parties 
(16 PERB tf3011 [1983]). the District's attorney issued 
subpoenas to Miller for his college transcripts, 
information that it allegedly already had, thus indicating 
that the sole purpose of the subpoena was to harass 
Miller. The record shows that the District wanted to use 
the subpoenaed documents to impeach Miller's credibility 
in that earlier case. As Miller's credibility was a 
significant issue in that case, there is no question that 
the issuance of the subpoenas was an appropriate 
litigation procedure, and, as found by the ALJ, was not 
improperly motivated. Accordingly, we affirm on this 
ground the ALJ *s decision dismissing the second 
specification of Miller's charge. 
The third specification of Miller's charge is that 
the District instituted disciplinary proceedings against 
him under Education Law §3020-a without any valid basis. 
2/ 
thereby demonstrating its improper motivation.— In 
support of this proposition, he notes that he was 
exonerated of eight of the nine specifications of the 
^./processing of the instant case was delayed for a 
year pending the completion of the disciplinary case. 
Board - U-6174 
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disciplinary charge, most of which related to his alleged 
graduate degrees from Columbia. 
We have before us the decision in the disciplinary 
proceeding, and those parts of the record therein that the 
parties deemed relevant- The panel found Miller not 
guilty of the specifications of that charge dealing with 
his alleged graduate degrees. In exonerating Miller, the 
panel concluded that he had not fully understood what was 
required of him when he provided incorrect information on 
the questionnaires that he completed. It is clear from 
that record that there was a reasonable basis for the 
District to have instituted the disciplinary proceeding. 
Inasmuch as Miller's claim of improper motivation rests 
upon his assertion that the District instituted a sham 
disciplinary proceeding, we find, as did the ALJ. no 
improper motivation on the part of the District. 
Accordingly, we affirm on this ground the ALJ's dismissal 
3/ 
of this final specification of Miller's charge.— 
•2/ln his final exception. Miller argues that the ALJ 
erred in finding that the District had counseled him before 
it initiated the disciplinary proceeding. The evidence 
supports the ALJ's finding. 
9014 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Alt>any, New York 
•^fc^^ ^ 4^-**' 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. 
•JsT O^lOX 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
LOCAL 2. UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
AFT. 
Respondents. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7113 
SAMUEL KIMMEL. 
Charging Party. 
Samuel Kimmel. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Samuel Kimmel. a special education guidance 
counselor employed by the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District), 
filed the charge herein. It alleges that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing to 
provide him with a transfer list and a vacancy list, 
both of which are referenced in the District's 
collective bargaining agreement with the United 
Federation of Teachers, AFT (UFT). the employee 
~ 9018 
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organization that represents the guidance counselors 
employed by the District. The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
determined that this specification of the charge does 
not allege a violation of the Taylor Law in that it 
merely seeks enforcement of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Kimmel's charge also complains that UFT violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law by refusing to support a 
grievance brought by him to compel the District to give 
him the two lists. The charge specifies that UFT agreed 
with the District that the collective bargaining 
agreement does not entitle special education guidance 
counselors to the lists which Kimmel seeks, and that 
this information was communicated to the special 
education guidance counselors as a group. The Director 
dismissed this specification of the charge on the ground 
that as UFT was free to reach an agreement with the 
District treating special education guidance counselors 
differently from other guidance counselors, its 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 
did not violate the Taylor Law. 
The matter now comes to us on Kimmel's exceptions, 
which deal only with his complaint against UFT. Kimmel 
Board - U-7113 
alleges that "it has just come to my attention" that UFT 
is supporting the grievance of another special education 
guidance counselor who is also seeking access to 
transfer and vacancy lists. 
Assuming the accuracy ofr thisinformation, it 
suggests that UFT may have changed its position 
regarding the rights of special education guidance 
counselors under its agreement. If this is so. Kimmel 
can again reguest UFT to support a new grievance or 
await the results of the grievance of the other 
counselor. Alternatively, the new information might now 
support a charge against UFT that it has discriminated 
among special education guidance counselors. In our 
view, this would be an entirely different charge from 
that brought by Kimmel herein, which alleges a 
consistent UFT position that special education guidance 
counselors as a group have no right to transfer and 
vacancy lists. The new information is therefore not 
encompassed by the charge herein and may not be 
considered by us when offered for the first time in 
Kimmel's exceptions. 
Nothing else in Kimmel's exceptions raises any 
question regarding the correctness of the decision of 
the Director. Accordingly, we affirm that decision. 
Board - U-7113 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 11, 1984 
Albany, New York 
?' Harold'ft. Newman. Chai n a n 
c ? * ^ /O^Uca^ 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
J#~ %j u 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2F-5/ll/84 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6089 
DONALD J. BARNETT. 
Charging Party. 
JERRY ROTHMAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
DONALD J. BARNETT. ££0 se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Donald J. 
Barnett to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing his charge against the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District). 
The charge alleges four violations by the District. 
The first is that the District placed a number of documents 
relating to Barnett's grievances and improper practice 
charges in his personnel file. The ALJ dismissed this 
specification on the ground that there is no record 
evidence of improper use of any of those documents, and it 
is not a per se violation of the Taylor Law for a public 
employer to place documents that refer to grievances or 
improper practice cases in the personnel file of an 
employee. 
„- Q 
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Barnett next complains that the District denied him 
leave with pay to attend conferences and hearings on prior 
improper practice charges. The ALJ dismissed this 
specification on the ground that the Taylor Law does not 
require a public employer to give its employees leave with 
pay to attend PERB hearings and that there is no allegation 
or evidence that the denial was discriminatory. 
The third specification of the charge is that the 
District denied Barnett leave without pay to attend 
conferences and hearings in prior improper practice 
charges. The ALJ dismissed this specification on the 
ground that the evidence does not support the allegation. 
Finally. Barnett complains that the District refused 
to process a grievance he filed in his own behalf, 
referring him instead to a contract provision which 
provides for the initiation of certain grievances only by 
the United Federation of Teachers, Barnett's negotiating 
representative. The ALJ dismissed this specification on 
the ground that it was not improper for the District to 
refer Barnett to the contract provision relating to the 
initiation of a grievance. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law of the ALJ dismissing the last three 
specifications of the charge. 
J 
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With regard to the first specification of the charge, 
we do not agree with the view that it can never be a per se 
violation of the Act for an employer to place into an 
employee's official personnel file documents referencing 
grievances or improper practre-charges; Matters placed 
into a permanent personnel file may well have an effect 
upon an employee's future advancement, outside employment 
1/ 
and career prospects.- Therefore, the placement into 
such file of certain documents which directly and 
materially reference and pertain to an employee's exercise 
of protected Taylor Law activities, is likely to have a 
chilling effect upon the employee's exercise of those 
activities. This, therefore, would constitute prohibited 
interference irrespective of the employer's motivation. 
On the record of the instant case, however, we do not 
discern a basis for a per se violation of the Act. Even 
were we to assume that all the documents annexed to the 
charge were actually in Barnett's file, a fact not clear 
from the record, neither these, nor those few documents 
which were formally introduced into the record, have 
anything but incidental relevance to his exercise of 
l^Holt v. Board of Education, 52 NY2d 625, 633. 635-36 
(1981) 
Board - U-6089 -4 
protected activities. The documents consist primarily of 
letters or standardized forms by which Barnett requested 
leaves of absence, and letters from the school principal 
responding to those requests. The fact that Barnett 
listed the need to attend PERB conferences or hearings as 
the reason for his leave requests does not affect the 
essential nature of these documents, which simply pertain 
2/ to Barnett's attendance.— In these circumstances. 
proof of improper motivation is necessary. Since Barnett 
did not establish that leave requests involving grievances 
or PERB proceedings were the only such requests placed 
into his file, and since he did not present any other 
evidence from which even an inference of improper 
motivation might be drawn, this aspect of his charge must 
also be dismissed.— 
2/A charge presenting a related fact pattern was 
dismissed by the NLRB in Dayton Tire and Rubber Co.. 216 
NLRB NO. 173. 89 LRRM 1124. 1974-75 CCHNLRB «iri5564 at 
25865. 
l/Barnett's exceptions also contain various 
allegations of procedural error on the part of the ALJ. 
We have reviewed these allegations in light of the record 
and find them to be completely without merit. We have 
similarly examined the rest of the allegations in the 
exceptions and find them to be neither supported by the 
record nor relevant to the issues before us. 
Board - U-6089 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Albany. New York 
-7&**a ft hL> 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
&L. ;d£*M^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WHITNEY POINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
•"-Respondent,' 
-and- CASE NO. U-7080 
WHITNEY POINT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 3122. NYSUT/AFT. 
Charging Party. 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI. ESQS. (JOSEPH WALLEN. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
WILLIAM FINGER, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Whitney Point Teachers Association. Local 3122. NYSUT/AFT 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge that the Whitney Point Central 
School District (District) violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Taylor Law by requiring probationary teachers already 
in its employ who hold provisional certifications to 
complete a six-hour course in remedial or diagnostic 
reading. 
Board - U-7080 
The ALJ found that the Association and the District 
were parties to an agreement, a reasonable construction of 
which permitted the District to act as it did. 
Accordingly, he determined that the question presented by 
the charge was whether the District had acted in 
accordance with the agreement, a question which is not 
subject to this Board's jurisdiction. The ALJ also 
dismissed the charge on the ground that the alleged 
unilateral action of the District involves qualifications 
for employment and is therefore not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
The Association argues that the ALJ's jurisdictional 
determination is in error and his dismissal of the charge 
on the merits was issued prematurely. 
The pleadings indicate that there was an explicit 
provision in the parties' 1981-82 agreement authorizing 
the District to require teachers with provisional 
certifications to complete a minimum of six hours work in 
diagnostic or remedial reading. This clause was deleted 
from the parties' 1982-84 agreement. In its place the 
parties executed a side agreement which authorized the 
District to act in accordance with a specified opinion of 
the Education Commissioner. That opinion authorizes the 
District, acting pursuant to the resolution of its Board 
of Education, to impose requirements upon provisionally 
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certified teachers which exceed the requirements imposed by 
the Commissioner himself. 
According to the Association, at the pre-hearing 
conference, the ALJ inquired whether the charge alleges 
more than a contract violation. He asked the parties to 
brief this question and indicated that he would dismiss the 
charge for lack of jurisdiction if only a contract 
violation were alleged. The Association's brief to the ALJ 
merely addressed the question of jurisdiction and the 
District submitted no brief at all. The ALJ then dismissed 
the charge both on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits. 
We disagree with the ALJ's decision that the charge 
should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The 
jurisdictional test articulated in St. Lawrence County. 10 
PERB ir3058. at 3103 (1977). is that the Board will not 
enforce an agreement but it will interpret agreements 
to the limited extent of determining 
whether there has been a statutory 
violation, for example, to determine 
whether an employee organization has 
waived its right to negotiate on a 
particular subject so as to permit 
unilateral action by an employer. 
This decision is based upon the dissenting opinion in 
Town of Orangetown. 8 PERB 1[3042. at 3072 (1975). which 
says: 
I would find that in situations where an 
employer unilaterally institutes or 
establishes a term of employment not 
expressly provided for in the agreement or 
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withdraws a benefit not provided for in 
the contract without negotiating about it 
with the representative organization, this 
Board will take jurisdiction of a charge 
even though the employer relies upon a 
provision in the contract claiming either 
a right so to do or as constituting a 
waiver by the employee organization of its 
right to negotiate re same. 
Here the Association is claiming no contract right. The 
only contract" issue appears to be whether the contract 
constitutes a waiver of the Association's right to 
negotiate the course requirement by sanctioning unilateral 
action by the District. Such a question is subject to 
this Board's jurisdiction. 
The Association argues that the ALJ did not merely 
decide the jurisdictional question wrongly, but that he 
also interpreted the agreement by deciding the waiver 
issue on the merits and reached the scope of negotiation 
issue without first holding a hearing. There is no basis 
in the record for disputing the assertions made by the 
Association in its exceptions regarding the intended scope 
of the ALJ's decision discussed at the pre-hearing 
conference. It is clear to us that there was a 
misunderstanding between the ALJ and the Association as to 
what the Association should address in its brief. The 
Association believed that the sole issue to be addressed 
was the jurisdiction question and it did not address the 
merits of the charge. We therefore remand this matter to 
the ALJ for further consideration of those merits. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be 
remanded to the ALJ for further 
proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
&U- tfjUM*^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 20. 1983, the City of Amsterdam (City) filed a 
petition seeking to establish a negotiating unit 
consisting of 32 employees of its Department of Water and 
Sanitary Sewers. Nineteen of these employees perform 
water related operations for the Department and have been 
'A 
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represented by the Amsterdam City Employees Local Union 
No. 1614 & Council 66, American Federation of State. 
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME). The 
remaining 13 employees work at the Department's sewage 
'"treatment" plant and are in ai unit represented by the 
Amsterdam Wastewater Facility Local 065 of the Civil 
Service Employees Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME 
(CSEA). 
The water employees had worked for the City from 1967 
to 1980, at which time their negotiating unit included 
other City employees. A 1980 charter amendment created a 
separate Water Board with the power to hire and fire 
employees. Thereafter AFSCME negotiated a collective 
bargaining agreement which covered both the water 
employees and the other employees of the City who had been 
in the same negotiating unit. That agreement was executed 
on behalf of management by both the City and the Board of 
Water Commissioners.— 
i/The City asserts that the effect of the charter amendment 
was to create two negotiating units, while AFSCME asserts that it 
continued to represent blue-collar employees in a single unit. 
The difference between them is not significant here. It appears, 
however, that there was a single unit of the employees of two 
distinct employers who negotiated with AFSCME as an employer 
association. 
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When CSEA came to represent the sewage employees in 
1975. the sewage plant was a State facility. That 
facility was transferred to the City on July 1, 1982. and 
the City continued to deal with CSEA. 
In November 1982, the voters of the City approved a 
referendum which eliminated the Water Board and returned 
the water operations to the City. It also established the 
Water and Sanitary Sewer Department. The City argues that 
the creation of this new department combining water and 
sewage operations perforce requires the placement of the 
employees performing these operations into a single unit. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) rejected this argument and 
determined that both the AFSCME and CSEA units should be 
continued because of an undisputed history of effective 
representation of the employees in both units over an 
extended period of time. 
This matter now comes to us on the City's exceptions 
to the decision of the Director. 
In its exceptions, it reasserts the proposition that 
the mere creation of the Water and Sewer Department by a 
referendum compels the placement of the water and sewage 
employees in a single unit. We do not agree. 
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Nothing in the Taylor Law precludes the 
representation of employees of a single department in more 
than one negotiating unit. The City's argument must be 
understood as an allegation that its administrative 
convenience would be served if the two groups of employees 
were placed in a single unit. This is relevant to the 
second standard for unit determination set forth in §207.1 
of the Taylor Law. On the other hand, the undisputed long 
history of effective representation in both negotiating 
units, as correctly found by the Director, is indicative 
2/ 
of separate communities of interest.— This is relevant 
under the first standard set forth in §207.1. The 
Director considered both of these factors and gave them 
appropriate weight. According, we affirm his decision. 
^/The fact that this representation occurred while 
the two groups of employees each worked for an employer 
other than the City does not alter this proposition. The 
City is the successor employer of the Water Board and the 
State agency which operated the sewage plant. As such, 
it is required to deal with the unions that represented 
the employees of its two predecessors in the preexisting 
negotiating units, unless those negotiating units can 
otherwise be found to be inappropriate. Compare Burns 
International Detective Agency. 406 U.S. 277. 80 LRRM 
2225 (1972), and Howard Johnson. 417 U.S. 249, 86 LRRM 
2449 (1974). 
'm" nJ1 1M 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be, a 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Albany. New York 
-""""^  //Harold R. Newman, C Chairman 
cfifa. , jKM**<t.<4r-~ZL. 
Ida Klaus. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. 
Employer, 
--and- CASE NO. C-^ 2 7 54 
DOCTORS COUNCIL. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Doctors Council has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees appointed by the 
Transit Authority in the title of 
Physician. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
„• 9085 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Doctors Council and enter into 
a written agreement with such employee organization with regard 
to terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the 
unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with 
such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: May 11. 1984 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. Me'mber 
